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ABSTRACT :
What are the consequences of laws imposing profit-sharing rates in the compensation of all forms of
labor, when only a limited share of the productive sector is really making profit ? This problem is
examined in the case of competitive labor markets, when firms of the profitable sector are facing a
predetermined participation constraint. The proposed model details how legal profit-sharing contracts
offer a form of evasion from wage-based social contributions in permitting substitution of wages with
contingent claims on profits. Labor contracts are examined in a context in which effort is monitored or in




-  labor contract
RESUME :
Quelles sont les conséquences de lois instituant un partage du profit obligatoire ? Cette question est
examinée lorsqu’une partie seulement de l’économie, relativement protégée réalise des profits
significatifs, le reste du secteur productif étant soumis à une concurrence ouverte. Dans l’hypothèse d’un
marché du travail concurrentiel, le modèle montre comment la loi permet aux entreprises privilégiées de
conserver leur personnel en substituant des parts de profit aux salaires, réduisant leur contribution aux
charges sociales de la collectivité prélevées sur la masse salariale.
Mots-clés :
-  participation
-  contrat de travail
-  contribution sociale
JEL classification : H3, K31Abstract
What are the consequences of laws imposing pro…t-sharing rates in the compen-
sation of all forms of labor, when only a limited share of the productive sector
is really making pro…t?
This problem is examined in the case of competitive labor markets, when
…rms of the pro…table sector are facing apredetermined participation constraint.
The proposed model details how legal pro…t-sharing contracts o¤er a form of
evasion from wage-based social contributions in permitting substitution of wages
with contingent claims on pro…ts. Labor contracts are examined in a context
in which e¤ort is monitored or in which free-riding e¤ects thwart the incentive
e¤ects of pro…t-sharing.1 Introduction
The private sector of a competitive market economy should theoretically gen-
erate a wide variety of labor contracts. In the simplest case, assumed by the
received neoclassical tradition, labor services are measured in time units ex-
changed for a predetermined monetary compensation. When the labor input
takes the form of some e¤ort level unambiguously signaled by output itself, …rst
best incentive contracts remain feasible. In other circumstances however, output
is determined jointly by the worker’s e¤ort and by some parameter chosen by
”nature”. If e¤ort is observable at high or in…nite costs, and if individual output
is observable, second best compensation patterns are proposed by agency theory.
An important complementary result in this direction is due to Bengt Holmström
(1979) who formalized the welfare increasing e¤ect obtained in including infor-
mative proxies of the unobservable e¤ort level into the compensation rules. More
generally, the incentive literature, as summarized by Prendergast (1999) in his
detailed survey, has analyzed in depth a variety of possible situations related
to more or less available relevant information, di¤erent strategic settings and
e¤ort monitoring costs.
A politically appealing form of labor compensation is pro…t-sharing. Ac-
cording to Weitzman (1985) contracts with pro…t-sharing have some interesting
properties for the whole economy, stabilizing the demand for goods and services,
and therefore limiting the need to resort to countercyclical policies. They can
however be criticized on other theoretical grounds. Not only they are submitted
to a risk-incentive trade-o¤, like many other e¤ort stimulating compensation
schemes, but their incentive properties in large organisations could be severely
limited by free-riding. The productivity e¤ect of pro…t-sharing in large or-
ganizations is still a debated issue. According to Weitzman and Kruse (1990),
Kruse (1992), Jones and Kato (1995) Prendergast (1999), Fakhfakh and Perotin
(2000), empirical evidence sometimes leans towards some limited but positive
productivity enhancing e¤ects, usually attributed to peer pressure among em-
ployees as suggested by Kandel and Lazear (1992). Milkovich and Newman
(1999) indicate however that American companies have recently moved towards
input based incentives or gain sharing schemes. A case study of such successful
gain sharing plans is for instance available in Gross and Duncan (1998).
A particular situation has been created in relation to labor compensation
in some countries, where institutional constraints tend to limit the feasible pat-
terns of labor contract and where pro…t-sharing is mandatory, being extended
to any form of labor. In France, for instance, predetermined pro…t-sharing
rules have been decreed or legislated in an atmosphere of exceptional political
consensus (August 1967, November 1990, July 1994). Under the heading of
”participation”, the law (summarized in appendix I) compels the …rms of more
than …fty employees to share a signi…cant proportion of reported bene…ts with
workers. The alleged political foundations of this regulation pertain to income
distribution objectives, but also to incentive and social considerations. If we
take them at their face-value, pro…t-sharing should shift the …nal distribution of
income in favor of workers. Simultaneously, it is expected to blunt the edge of
1social con‡icts between shareholders and workers, sparing strikes or other costly
collective con‡icts. Finally, it is supposed to stimulate e¤ort and the quality of
labor services. It can be suspected, however, that the actual long term conse-
quences of such mandatory rules applied to a competitive labor market could
be far from this idealized picture.
It should be mentioned that mandatory pro…t-sharing has been vindicated in
an original way by Bensaid and Gary-Bobo (1991), who showed that, within an
oligopolisticcontext in the output market, traditional Cournot-Nash equilibrium
implicitly based on straight wage labor compensation is not robust if pro…t-
sharing is allowed. They show that in such a case, each …rm individually has an
incentive to diminish wages and share pro…ts with workers, increasing its market
share and its residual pro…t. The generalized pro…t-sharing Nash equilibrium in
this case appears to be more favorable to the consumer thanks to an increased
industry supply, but pro…ts are reduced. A step towards cooperation between
…rms of the same trade would therefore consist in a mutual commitment to
rule out pro…t-sharing and a law would be required to preclude this form of
collusion. This striking result is, however, obtained in a special output market
structure, without consideration of uncertainty, risk aversion of workers and,
last but not least, neglecting the role of wage based taxes exacted from the
…rms in explaining the structure of labor contracts.
In the presently available macroeconomic literature on this topic including
Weitzman (1985), Artus (1988 ), Bughin (1999), pro…t-sharing is represented
either in a one-…rm one-worker setting or more generally in situations in which
the skewness observed in the distribution of pro…t rates is not given due con-
sideration. The role of wage based contributions is generally omitted.
Since economic pro…t in a competitive world is only possible for the more
innovative or the more protected sector of the productive system, models based
on a unique type of …rm could be seriously misleading. We propose a di¤erent
framework, adapted to a stylized representation of the French law, applying to
a weakly unionized economy in which signi…cant social contribution are paid by
…rms in proportion of wages.
In order to analyze the e¤ects of legal pro…t-sharing imposed to the compen-
sation of all workers of pro…table …rms, we consider a ”dual” economy in the
following sense: a …rst smaller sector comprises larger …rms reaping signi…cant
pro…ts, and a second sector represents the rest of the productive system, com-
prising small …rms not concerned by the ”participation” law and alsolarger …rms
submitted to pro…t-squeezing open product competition. The consequences of
imposed pro…t-sharing rules in this context could be less optimistically depicted.
In the case of a competitive labor market, labor contracts in the …rst sector are
only submitted to a participation constraint whose value is determined by the
satisfaction obtainable by workers in the second sector or possibly in unemploy-
ment. For the pro…table …rm, pro…t-sharing may appear as a means of reducing
wages and wage-based social contributions, in keeping with the participation
constraint. Substitution of wages with contingent pro…t-shares is more than
a theoretical prediction; it has been traced in the data pertaining to a large
sample of French …rms by Sylvie Mabile (1998), who shows unambiguous signs
2of this adjustment, after some time has elapsed. A further consequence could
be government reaction, since the authorities cannot observe impassively the
loss of wage-based social contributions obtained from the …rst sector. For sup-
posedly constant distributed welfare bene…ts, the authorities have to increase
social contribution rates applied on wages for the whole economy. The burden
of collected welfare resources would therefore be partly reshu-ed from the more
pro…table sector to the whole economy, a side e¤ect probably unintended by the
law.
Our text is organized as follows: in section 3, we analyse the optimal con-
tracts when the …rms freely determine the parameters of a pro…t-sharing pat-
tern, from straight wage to pure partnership. In section 4, we introduce the
main features of the French law, imposing the sharing of positive pro…ts only at
a predetermined rate and examine their impact on wages and collected social
contributions.
2 Assumptions:
The law extends pro…t-sharing to all workers, blue or white collars, senior man-
agers or rank and …le employees working under tight supervision. It applies to
relatively large …rms, with probable free-riding e¤ects. We adopt the following
assumptions.
1- The pro…t-making …rm is risk-neutral; the applied technology involves a
stationary probability density function of per worker net output x. This density
f(x) is de…ned and positive from a minimum value x
¯
> 0 to an upper bound ¯ x;
or 8x 2 [x
¯
,¯ x]: The e¤ort level is predetermined by the production process or by
monitoring, so that the density f(x) is una¤ected by the labor contract. The
per worker net ouput x is in fact a company average and does not have to be
an observable individual contribution.
2- The worker is risk averse and her/his e¤ort level is monitored or prede-
termined by the production process.
3- A contract is accepted by the worker (participation constraint) only if the




f(x)U(c)dx ¸ V where
U( ) is neoclassical.
The value of V is the satisfaction level to be found in working for the second
sector. This satisfaction level may also be related to the welfare expenses of the
government but this e¤ect is omitted as a constant since it is not in‡uenced by
the individual decision of the …rm. In this context of decentralized contracting,
the government budget constraint is not internalized by the agents.
4- The workers have to bear the risk related to the labor contract.
As aconsequence of assumtions (1) and (2), equilibrium in acomplete market
system should induce the risk neutral subset of agents (the …rm owners) to
ultimately bear all the risk, either in contracting straight wages in the labor
market, or in subsequent trading in the contingent claims market. Assumption
4 is often admitted in the literature as a consequence of incomplete …nancial
3markets. It is particularly relevant in the case of French legal pro…t-sharing
since the pro…t-shares accruing to the worker are in fact deferred compensations
compulsorily invested for …ve years, most often in the equity market. (Appendix
I)
We consider …rst a situation in which pro…t-sharing is permitted but not
imposed by the law. It will be shown in which conditions straight wage, pro…t-
sharing or pure partnership contracts should prevail, …rst in considering general
pro…t-sharing, then in introducing the French legal feature according to which
the workers is entitled to share positive pro…ts only.
3 Private pro…t-sharing
3.1 Free contracting
In the simplest case when there is no public interference, the optimum paying
rule based on output c = h(x) is the solution of the problem:
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f(x)U [h(x)]dx ¸ V
(1)











f(x)U [h(x)]dx ¡ V
#
(2)




0(x) = 0 (3)
This condition is ful…lled if h0(x) = 0 or if U0(c) = 1=¸ = C st .
Both conditions imply c = h(x) = Cst ) h0(x) = 0:
The optimal compensation is a constant, called wage: c = w




f(x)U [h(x)]dx = U(w) = V
As is well-known from the relevant literature, the risk-neutral …rm maximizes
expected pro…t in bearing all the risk and in paying non random compensation
for labor services.
43.2 Contracts with institutional constraints
We consider now a more detailed setting in which, due to institutional rules, the
set of feasible functions h(x) is restricted in the following way: compensation is
constrained to include a non-random component called wage w ¸ 0.
(The possibility of negative wage in which the worker ”buys the job”as ex-
posed in Lazear (1995) in a di¤erent context is examined in Appendix II).
The other component of compensation is a …xed proportion µ ¸ 0 of the
pro…t ¼ calculated after subtracting the social contributions levied on wages at
rate ¿:
The gross pro…t ¼ to be shared is:
¼ = x ¡ w(1 + ¿) (4)
Compensation has therefore to take the special form: h(x) = w+µ [x ¡ w(1+ ¿)];
or
c = µx + w [1 ¡ µ(1 + ¿)] (5)
The residual claim R of the owner is
R = (1¡ µ)¼ (6)
Milgrom and Holmström (1987) have obtained general conditions for the
optimality of such linear rules. But as mentioned by Dixit (2002), such simple
patterns are often observed even when their theoretical conditions are not met,
for their simplicity and their robustness against manipulation.







subject to V e(w;µ) ¸ V
w ¸ 0; µ ¸ 0
(7)




f(x)[x ¡ w(1+ ¿)]dx





We analyse interior solutions (w;µ), straight wage solutions (w;0) and pure
partnership solutions (0;µ); for pro…table …rms, such that Re and therefore ¼e
are positive.
We …rst show that straight wage cannot be a solution in this setting.
53.2.1 Straight wage impossibility
We introduce the following Lagrangian:










f(x)U fcgdx ¡ V
3
5 (8)
The necessary …rst order conditions for a straight wage solution
(w > 0;µ = 0) are:
$w = ¡(1+ ¿)(1 ¡ µ) + ¸[1¡ µ(1 + ¿)]E[U 0(c)] = 0 (9)
$µ = ¡¼e + ¸E [¼U0(c)] · 0 (10)
For µ = 0; and c = w; the two …rst order conditions take the particular
forms:
¡(1 + ¿) + ¸U0(w) = 0 (11)
¡¼e + ¸¼eU 0(w) · 0 (12)
From the …rst equation, ¸ =
1 + ¿
U0(w)




The two necessary conditions are contradictory 8¿ > 0:
We conclude that when pro…t-sharing is allowed in the compensation of work,
the existence of wage based contributions always induces the …rm to share pro…ts
with workers, in the absence of any incentive e¤ect of such contracts.
3.2.2 Pure partnership: a necessary condition
We show that pure partnership cannot be a solution when the tax rate ¿ is
smaller than some lower bound ¿m > 0:
In the the pure partnership contract, µ > 0 and w = 0; Re = (1 ¡ µ)xe;
c = µx and no tax is paid by the …rm. The value of µ is uniquely determined
by the participation constraint:




f(x)U(^ µx)dx = V (13)
Obviously, ^ µ 2 ]0;1[
6The …rst order conditions applying to (8) are:





$w = ¡(1 + ¿)(1¡ ^ µ) + ¸
h







The two conditions (14) and (15) imply:
1¡ ^ µ(1 + ¿)



















It can be shown that 0 < ° < 1: The …rst inequality 0 < ° is straightforward,
all the expected values being positive. The second inequality ° < 1 is derived


























(16) may be written as
1¡ ^ µ(1 + ¿)
(1+ ¿)(1 ¡ ^ µ)
· ° or equivalently:
1+ ¿ ¸
1
°(1 ¡ ^ µ) + ^ µ
(18)
Since 0 < ° < 1 and 0 < ^ µ < 1; the denominator °(1 ¡ ^ µ) + ^ µ , a convex
combination of ° and 1; is smaller than one and
1
°(1 ¡ ^ µ) + ^ µ
> 1:
A necessary condition for partnership as a corner solution is therefore:
¿ ¸
1




°(1¡ ^ µ) + ^ µ
¡ 1 > 0; (19) implies that partnership cannot
be a solution unless ¿ ¸ ¿m:
The intuitive interpretation of this condition is that for small values of ¿, the
cost of compensating the worker for the risk level implied by pure partnership
is not balanced by savings on wage-based contributions.
A consequence of this result is that only interior solutions may exist when
0 < ¿ < ¿m
73.2.3 Interior solutions:
Weïerstrass theorem, applied to (7) guarantees the existence of such interior
solutions. They must ful…ll …rst order conditions (9) and (10) as equalities:
Eliminating ¸ impies:
E f¼U0(c)g =
1 ¡ µ(1+ ¿)
(1 + ¿)(1¡ µ)
E f¼gE fU0(c)g (20)
No interior solution is compatible with
1
1+ ¿
< µ since in this case, from (5)
and (4) decreasing the wage rate w increases pro…t and consumption for each




be a pure partnership.
3.3 Sharing positive pro…ts only
According to the French law, the worker does not incur the risk of sharing losses,
and the …rm has to share positive pro…ts. In this case
c = supfw;w + µ [x ¡ w(1 + ¿)]g (21)
We introduce the following complementary notations:
Event (1) is de…ned by x · w(1 + ¿): a non-positive result called loss is





Event (2) is de…ned by x ¸ w(1 + ¿) : a non-negative result called pro…t is








In particular E2(¼) is the expectation of (positive) pro…t.





f(x) [x ¡ w(1 + ¿)]dx + (1 ¡ µ)
¹ x Z
x=w(1+¿)
f(x)[x ¡ w(1+ ¿)]dx
(22)









8with c = w + µ [x ¡ w(1 + ¿)]:
Having noticed that the terms of the derivatives related to the integration
limits cancel out, the partial derivatives of (22) and (23) are respectively:
R
e
w(w;µ) = ¡(1+ ¿)[1¡ µp2(w)] (24)
R
e








µ (w;µ) = E2 [¼U
0(c)] (27)
E2 f¼g is the expected value of positive pro…t and is non negative; E2 f¼U0(c)g
is positive, since marginal utilities are weighted by positive pro…ts only.
3.3.1 Straight wage impossibility
We show that when the worker is not exposed to the risk of sharing losses, the
optimal contract is not compatible with straight wage.
First order conditions applied tothe Lagrangian $ = Re(w;µ)+¸[V e(w;µ) ¡ V
¯
]










µ (w;µ) · 0 (29)



















For µ = 0; we have E2 [u0(c)] = p2(w)u0(w) and E2 [¼u0(c)] = u0(w)E2 [¼]







For su¢cient values of w; p2(w) = 0 and E2(¼) = E2 [¼u0(c)] = 0, and the
right hand member of (31) is indeterminate, but since we consider by assumtion
…rms able to ful…ll the participation constraint with positive expected pro…ts,
this case is not relevant and the proof is completed.
93.3.2 Condition for pure partnership
When the wage component of compensation is nil the pro…t is always positive
and the problem coincides with (7)
It is therefore possible to extend the conclusion according to which no pure
partnership solutions exist for ”small” values of the tax rate ¿:
4 The e¤ect of a binding legislated pro…t-sharing
rate
It is still assumed in this section that positive pro…ts only are shared with
workers.
In order to bring out the e¤ect of mandatory pro…t-sharing, we sketch a
global graphical approach in the space (w;µ)










p1(w)u0(w) + [1 ¡ µ(1+ ¿)]E2 [u0(c)]
E2 [¼u0(c)]
(33)
This slope is always negative, for µ < 1=(1 + ¿).













(1+ ¿)[1 ¡ µp2(w)]
E2(¼)
(34)
We show that this slope is itself decreasing in w:
For notational convenience, we de…ne the explicit function µ = f(w) by
Re
w [w;f(w)] = C; where C is an arbitrary positive constant. From the de…ni-
tion,









We show that f 00(w) < 0
Since
p0
2(w) = ¡(1 + ¿)f [w(1+ ¿)] < 0 and
dE2(¼)
dw





2(w)E2(¼) ¡ 2(1 + ¿)p2(w)[1 ¡ µp2(w)]g (36)
This expresssion is clearly negative 8µ 2 ]0;1[
On …gure 1, a thick curve represents the participation constraint, dotted
curves represent constant level of expected residual pro…t, point P represents
10the optimum contract (interior solution) for the …rm when pro…t-sharing is
admitted without binding participation rate, point L represents the contract
chosen by the employer when a predetermined pro…t-sharing rate µL has been
legislated; wL is the smallest wage ful…lling the participation constraint in this
case.
It must be kept in mind that the curve LP representing the participation
constraint is not necessarily convex, and that we cannot rule out multiple solu-











From …gure 1, the consequences of the legal constraint µL might be:
a decreased level of expected residual pro…t,
a lower wage wL, depending on the slope of the curve P L always negative
and measured in each point by (33)
Since the uniqueness of the private solution P has not been proved by ana-
lytical arguments, we cannot rule out cases in which the legal constraint would
shift the solution from one interior solution to another, leaving expected residual
pro…t at a constant level.
In some cases, the law could induce the …rm to o¤er pure partnership, reduc-
ing the collected social contributions to zero, realizing the extreme form of tax
evasion. In any case, in consequence of the unambiguous slope of the curve rep-
resenting the participation constraint, the legislated binding pro…t rate tends to













Figure 2, compatible with our axioms, illustrates a situation where the legal
constraint determines the …rm to resort to pure partnership. The participa-
tion constraint is represented by the thick curve from SW (straight wage) to
P P (pure partnership). Dotted convex curves still represent constant levels of
residual pro…t. If pro…t-sharing is forbidden, SW is solution. If pro…t-sharing
is permitted, the optimal private contract is observed in P; with wage wp and
pro…t-sharing rate µp. If pro…t-sharing is imposed at rate µL, the optimal con-
tract is not in L, but jumps to the pro…t-sharing corner solution P P:
The singular point I represents a contract considered equivalent to pure
partnership P P by both the …rm and the worker. The jump to pure partnership
takes place if the legislated rate µL > µI; the pro…t-sharing rate observed in I:
5 Conclusion:
We have shown how and in which conditions the introduction of mandatory
pro…t-sharing can end up with substitution of wages with pro…t-shares, at least
in the case of competitive labor markets, when …rms of the pro…table sector
are not constrained by a wage level, but by a constant participation constraint.
This substitution is itself a failure for the income redistribution objective of
the law; furthermore, it generates ine¢ciency in compelling the worker to bear
risk. Since social contribution are mainly levied on wages in the present state of
the welfare system, this substitution also reduces the welfare oriented resources
12collected by the government from the more pro…table sector and could require
increased rates applied to the whole economy. In this stylized scheme, the
ultimate consequence of the law amounts to a perverse redistributive e¤ect.
This e¤ect is reinforced in the French legal setting by the privileged tax regime
of the pro…t-sharing component of compensation: any substitution of wages by
pro…t-shares not only reduces wage based social contribution, but also reduces
the net pro…t based taxes paid by the …rm, and the income taxes paid by their
workers.
As pointed out by Atkinson (1999), any constraint applied to a system ini-
tially supposed in a …rst best equilibrium tends to reduce e¢ciency and the
analysis of any regulation should logically integrate in its assumptions the de-
terminants of the market failure this regulation aims at correcting. Legal pro…t
sharing however, does not adress a particular market failure in the current in-
terpretation of this term. When pro…t-sharing is able to enhance productivity,
it should be spontaneously adopted to some extent by rational …rms. The re-
distributive ambition of the law may be politically legitimate, but di¢cult to
achieve in the framework of a free competitive system, and calls for simul-
tanously reshaping the social contribution patterns. In its present state, it can
be suspected to work in favor of the already more favored sector of the economy.
Other representations of the labor market are possible and necessary for
a more complete analysis. In particular, in the hypothesis of segmented labor
markets, the pro…table sector of the economy could also be more unionized. Em-
pirical evidence showing the existence of industry or company wage di¤erentials
limits the value of the competitive hypothesis and of the concept of participa-
tion constraint. According to Alison Booth (1983) commenting on econometric
investigations for Great Britain by Stewart (1983) ”…rms with market power pay
more than competitive …rms even in the absence of unionization”. This mit-
igating observation ist however itself limited by the already mentioned result
obtained from French data by Sylvie Mabile (1998) showing e¤ective substitu-
tion of wages with pro…t-shares.
Other complementary studies would be necessary to predict the e¤ects of
the law when collecive bargaining is deemed more relevant than the competitive
hypothesis. They should determine how the …rm and the unionized workers
share the savings on taxes and social contribution permitted by the legal setting.
Finally, in a dynamic perspective, the long run e¤ects of mandatory pro…t-
sharing on the investment and innovation process, in the context of open inter-
national competition extended to capital markets would also be needed for a
more complete evaluation of the law.
6 Appendix I : stylized summary of the French
law on pro…t-sharing
It must be noticed that the de…nition of pro…t used in the French legal setting
is a proxy of the concept of ”economic pro…t”, since it takes into account the
13capital cost of equity.
In its present form (July 25th, 1994) the law applies to all …rms employing 50
persons ore more; the amount P accruing each year to the personnel is de…ned
by the legal formula:






where ¼ is the reported accounting pro…t of the …rm, 5%K represents a
conventional return on shareholders equity K; and
W
TAV
stands for the ratio of
the distributed wages W on the total added value TAV .
The law requires the distribution of participation P to be deferred by …ve
years (but for a few legally de…ned exceptions). A participation fund is created
in the name of the workers in di¤erent forms of securities under the terms of a
collective agrement. After …ve years, each employee is authorized to liquidate
her/his portfolio, being exempted of taxes on capital gains. In other words, the
legal system combines pro…t sharing with forced savings.
The distribution of P to the individuals is capped; it is proportional to their
wages with an absolute upper limit.
The amount distributed as legal pro…t-sharing is deducted by the …rm from
taxable net pro…t. The amount received by the employees is not submitted to
income tax.
7 Appendix II : the case of negative wages
Contracts with negative wages appear as solution of the optimal compensation,
especially for risk neutral workers, when e¤ort modi…es the probabilty distribu-
tion of output (Lazear 1995). In our context, studying the existence of negative
wage solutions implies lifting the constraint w ¸ 0 in problem (7). Since no
negative taxes are paid to the …rm in proportion of the negative wage compo-
nent, …rst order conditions should hold for ¿ = 0: Obviously, for such a solution
satisfying the participation constraint implies µ > 0 , the worker being a partial
residual claimant of output and equation (20) should hold for ¿ = 0; implying:
E f¼U 0(c)g = E f¼gE fU0(c)g (38)
For risk averse workers, this equality is incompatible with µ > 0 , pro…t and
marginal utilty of consumption not being in this case independent variables.
Since consumption is random for µ > 0, (38) may hold only if U0(c) = Cst;
i.e. for a risk-neutral worker.
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